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Abstract. Relay attacks are a major concern for RFID systems: during an au-
thentication process an adversary transparently relays messages between a veri-
fier and a remote legitimate prover.
We present an authentication protocol suited for RFID systems. Our solution is
the first that prevents relay attacks without degrading the authentication security
level: it minimizes the probability that the verifier accepts a fake proof of identity,
whether or not a relay attack occurs.
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1 Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) allows to identify objects or subjects without
any physical nor optical contact, using transponders — micro-circuits with an antenna
— queried by readers through a radio frequency channel. This technology is one of the
most promising of this decade and is already widely used in applications such as access
cards, transportation passes, payment cards, and passports. This success is partly due to
the steadily decrease in both size and cost of passive transponders called tags.
The relay attack1 exhibited by Desmedt, Goutier, and Bengio [5] recently became a
major issue of concern for RFID authentication protocols. The adversary pretends to be
the legitimate prover by relaying the messages that are exchanged during the execution
of the protocol. This is illustrated through the following example.
Consider an RFID-based ticket selling machine in a theater. To buy a ticket, the
customer is not required to show his theater pass, an RFID tag. The customer needs to be
close enough to the machine (verifier) so that the pass (prover) can communicate with it.
The pass can be kept in the customer’s pocket during the transaction. Assume there is a
line of customers waiting for a ticket. Bob and Charlie masterminded the attack. Charlie
is in front of the machine while Bob is far in the queue, close to Alice, the victim.
When the machine initiates the transaction with Charlie’s card, Charlie forwards the
received signal to Bob who transmits it to Alice. The victim’s tag automatically answers
since a passive RFID tag — commonly used for such applications — responds without
requiring the agreement of its holder. The answer is then transmitted back from Alice
1 Sometimes referred to as Mafia fraud.
to the machine through Bob and Charlie who act as relays. The whole communication
is transparently relayed and the attack eventually succeeds: Alice pays Charlie’s ticket.
When it was first introduced in the late eighties, the relay attack appeared unrealis-
tic. Nowadays, the relay attack is one of the most effective and feared attacks against
RFID systems; it can be easily implemented since the reader and the tag communi-
cate wirelessly, and it is not easily detectable by the victim because queried (passive)
tags automatically answer to the requests without agreement of their bearers. Recently,
Halva´cˇ and Rosa [6] noticed that the standard ISO 14443, related to proximity cards
and widely deployed in biometric passports, can easily be abused by a relay attack due
to the untight timeouts in the communication.
All current authentication protocols that prevent relay attacks perform rather poorly
against an adversary that does not relay messages. They guarantee the same security
level regardless of the adversary’s ability to relay messages. This may be considered as
a weakness, in particular in situations where relay attacks are hard to perform.
We introduce a new authentication protocol suited for RFID systems with the prop-
erty that it minimizes the false-acceptance probability whether or not a relay attack
occurs. In Section 2 we present our protocol. Section 3 is devoted to the security anal-
ysis. Section 4 addresses the optimality of our solution. In Section 5 we compare our
protocol with related authentication protocols.
2 Protocol
2.1 Protocol requirements and assumptions
In the presence of the legitimate prover, the authentication protocol must guarantee
that the verifier always accepts his proof of identity. The protocol must also prevent
an adversary of being falsely identified assuming she can participate either passively or
actively in protocol executions with either or both the prover and the verifier. This means
that the adversary can 1) eavesdrop protocol executions between the legitimate prover
and the verifier (passive attack); 2) be involved in protocol executions with the verifier
and the legitimate prover separately or simultaneously (active attack). We assume that
neither the prover nor the verifier colludes with the adversary, i.e., the only information
the adversary can obtain is through protocol executions. Finally, we assume that the
legitimate prover and the adversary never want to get simultaneously authenticated.
Given an integer N ≥ 1, we consider that the adversary is successful if she is able to
impersonate the legitimate prover within N protocol executions involving either passive
or active attacks. Throughout the paper, N is considered as a fixed constant and, in the
RFID context, may be interpreted as the typical number of authentications the tag can
support during its life.
2.2 Protocol description
Prior to the protocol execution, the legitimate prover and the verifier agree on a common
secret key k in the form of a binary string of length
ℓk = 2
n+2 − 2 (1)
for some integer n ≥ 1. The protocol consists of three parts: initialization, authentica-
tion, and proximity check. The initialization and the authentication parts are executed
during a “slow phase” where no time measure takes place. The proximity check, in-
stead, involves time measure and is often referred to as the “fast phase.”
In addition to ℓk, the protocol involves two positive integers ℓa and ℓb whose values
will be specified in Section 3.
Initialization. The prover sends a random ℓa-bit string a to the verifier and, similarly,
the prover sends a random ℓb-bit string b to the verifier. With a, b, and their common
secret key k, the verifier and the prover generate a full binary tree τ(a, b, k) of depth
n+ 1 as follows (see Fig. 1 for an example). The left and the right edges are labeled 0
and 1, respectively, and each node (except the root) takes the value 0 or 1 depending on
a, b, and k.
The “tree valued” function τ(a, b, k) is a one-to-one function whenever two of the
three variables a, b, k are kept fixed. (For this to be possible, ℓa and ℓb must be at most
equal to ℓk since the total number of complete binary trees of depth n + 1 is equal to
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Fig. 1. Decision tree with n = 2 and ℓk = 14. The thick line path in the tree corresponds
to the verifier’s challenges 0, 1 and the prover’s replies 1, 0.
Authentication. The prover transmits the m bits corresponding to the m leftmost
leaves, starting from the left. The value of m will be specified in Section 3. For now, m
is some value smaller than 2n+1, the total number of leaves.
Proximity check. An n-round fast bit exchange between the verifier and the prover pro-
ceeds using the tree. The edge and the node values represent the “verifier’s challenges”
and the “prover’s replies,” respectively. At each step i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} the verifier gen-
erates a challenge in the form of a random bit qi and sends it to the prover. The prover
replies by sending the value of the node in the tree whose edge path from the root is
qi = q1, q2, . . . , qi. This reply is denoted by ri(qi).
In the example illustrated by Fig. 1, the verifier always replies 0 in the second round
unless the first and the second challenges are equal to one in which case the verifier
replies 1, i.e., r2(q2) = 0 for q2 6= 11 and r2(q2) = 1 for q2 = 11. Finally, for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the verifier measures the time interval between the instant qi is sent
until ri(qi) is received.
The round-trip time for each challenge-response round guarantees that the prover
is close from the verifier. Hence, a typical threshold is a value close to 2d/c where d
denotes the distance from the verifier to the expected position of the prover and where
c denotes the speed of light.
Verifier Prover
[ Start of slow phase ]
Nonce generation a∈{0,1}
ℓa
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b∈{0,1}ℓb
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Nonce generation
Tree construction:
{ri(·)}
n+1
i=1
Tree construction:
{ri(·)}
n+1
i=1
s1,s2,...,sm←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Authentication
[ End of slow phase ]
[ Start of fast phase ]
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
Challenge qi∈{0,1}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Lookup in the tree ri(q
i)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Lookup in the tree
[ End of fast phase ]
Fig. 2. Two-phase distance bounding protocol.
Final decision. The verifier accepts the prover’s identity only if the m authentication
bits are correct and if the n replies of the fast phase are correct while meeting the
challenge-response time constraint. The protocol is given in Fig. 2.
3 Security analysis
We are interested in the probability of the event “over N protocol executions, the ver-
ifier accepts the proof of identity of the attacker at least once.” To compute this quan-
tity, we make the following assumption which we discuss below: one protocol execu-
tion provides no information to the attacker about the secret key k. As a corollary, the
knowledge of a and b only reveals nothing about the assignment of each node which,
independently, may take the values 0 or 1 with probability 1/2.
At first, the above assumption may rise some doubts since the m authentication bits
and the n bits sent during the fast phase by the prover depend on the secret key. In
practice, however, this assumption may be justified by arguing that if m + n is much
smaller that the size of the key, ℓk = 2n+2 − 2, one protocol execution reveals almost
no information about the secret key. To be consistent with our assumption, from now
on we assume that m = m(n) = o(ℓk), i.e., that m grows sub-exponentially with n.
To compute the probability of false-authentication, we distinguish two cases de-
pending on whether during the N protocol executions the adversary acts alone — i.e.,
without interacting either passively or actively with the legitimate prover — or not.
3.1 Attack without involving the legitimate prover
We upper and lower bound the probability of false-acceptance (f-a) as
Pr(f-a|E) Pr(E) ≤ Pr(f-a) ≤ Pr(f-a|E) + Pr(Ec) (2)
where E denotes the event “over N protocol executions all trees are different” and
where Ec denotes the complement of E. Conditioned on E, the adversary maintains
a uniform prior on the secret key k on each protocol execution. Therefore, for each
protocol execution the adversary achieves a probability of success (at best) equal to
2−(m+n), corresponding to random guesses. It follows that
Pr(f-a|E) = N · 2−(m+n) + o(2−(m+n)) (n→∞) . (3)
The computation of Pr(Ec) refers to the birthday paradox. By letting ℓa = m + n, a
standard calculation reveals that2
Pr(Ec) ≤
N(N − 1)
2m+n+1
+O(2−2(m+n)) (n→∞) . (4)
From (2),(3), and (4) we get
Pr(f-a) = Θ(2−(m+n)) (n→∞) . (5)
3.2 Attack involving the legitimate prover
We distinguish two sub-cases, depending on whether the adversary can or cannot relay
messages.
With relay. In this case, the adversary can execute man-in-the-middle attacks to pass
the authentication step for each of the N protocol executions; the adversary initiates
the protocol with the verifier and relays the nonces a, b, and the authentication string
s1, s2, . . . , sm. However, to succeed the adversary must pass the proximity check. We
compute the probability of false-acceptance (f-a) assuming the adversary passed the
2 The bound (4) is achieved if ℓb is kept fix during the N protocol executions.
authentication step. Similarly as in (2), we upper and lower bound the probability of
false-acceptance as
Pr(f-a|Eb) Pr(Eb) ≤ Pr(f-a) ≤ Pr(f-a|Eb) + Pr(Ecb ) (6)
where Eb denotes the event “over N protocol executions all b nonces are different.”
We first compute Pr(f-a|Eb). Because of the time constraint, the adversary cannot
relay information between the verifier and the prover during the fast phase. This means
that the adversary’s reply at time i must be independent of the verifier’s challenge at
time i, for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. However, because there is no time measure before the
fast phase, the adversary can query the legitimate prover with a sequence of challenges
q˜n, hoping these will correspond to the challenges qn provided by the verifier during the
fast phase. Because qn and q˜n are independently chosen, the probability of passing the
proximity check is the same for any q˜n. Hence, without loss of generality, we assume
that the adversary has access to the ri(q˜i)’s for q˜n = (0, 0, . . . , 0) , 0n. The adversary
is then successful only if ri(0i) = ri(qi) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. For conciseness,
from now on we write ri for ri(qi) and r˜i for ri(q˜i).
Letting t be the first time i ≥ 1 when qi = 1, we have that r˜i = ri for i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , t− 1}, and r˜i = ri with probability 1/2 for i ∈ {t, t+ 1, . . . , n}. Therefore,
letting rn , r1, r2, . . . , rn, the probability of a successful attack over one particular
protocol execution can be computed as
Pr(r˜n = rn) =
n∑
i=1
Pr(r˜n = rn|t = i) Pr(t = i)
+ Pr(r˜n = rn|qn = 0n) Pr(qn = 0n)
=
n∑
i=1
2−(n−i+1)2−i + 2−n
= 2−n(n/2 + 1)
and we get
Pr(f-a|Eb) = 2−n+o(1) (n →∞) . (7)
Similarly as in (4) we have
Pr(Ecb ) ≤
N(N − 1)
2ℓb+1
+O(2−2·ℓb) (ℓb →∞) . (8)
By taking ℓb ≥ n, from (6), (7), and (8) the highest probability of false-acceptance that
can be attained by an adversary who can relay messages satisfies
Pr(f-a) = 2−n(1+o(1)) (n→∞) . (9)
Without relay As one might observe, the security analysis in the above case “with
relay” never uses the nonce a. Suppose the adversary cannot relay signals. Without
the nonce a, the adversary can easily pass the authentication step by first obtaining the
nonce b and the corresponding authentication string from the legitimate prover, then by
presenting those to the verifier. The security is then based only on the proximity check.
Instead, with a nonce a, this attack is less likely to succeed. Indeed, one can readily see
that with ℓa = m + n as in Section 3.1, the probability of false-acceptance is as small
as in the case of attacks without legitimate prover and is given by (5).
4 Optimality of the proposed protocol
We discuss the optimality of the proposed protocol by restricting our attention to bit
exchange protocols that satisfy the following general properties:
• The verifier and the legitimate prover share a common secret in the form of a bit
string of length ℓk.
• The verifier always accepts the proof of identity of a legitimate prover.
• Neither the verifier nor the legitimate prover collude with the adversary.
Consider an authentication protocol that satisfies the above conditions. Among the
bits sent by the prover during the execution of the protocol, some depend on the com-
mon secret, and some do not. If m+n denotes the number of secret dependent bits, the
false-acceptance probability (per adversary trial) of the protocol is at best
2−(m+n)
regardless of the type of attack.
To overcome relay attacks, it is necessary that the verifier has a means to determine
whether the prover is close to him — in our case the time measure. If n denotes the
number of key dependent bits sent by the prover upon which the verifier evaluates his
proximity, the probability of false-acceptance (per adversary trial) in the presence of
relay attacks is at best
2−n .
In light of (5) and (9), our protocol is asymptotically optimal in the sense that the
exponential rate at which the false-acceptance probability goes to zero as m and n tend
to infinity is the best one can achieve among all protocols with the same parameters.
5 Discussion
Brands and Chaum [2] were the first to propose an authentication protocol using the
idea of a proximity check (or distance bounding) between the prover and the verifier.3
This protocol, similarly to ours, uses a proximity check in the form of rapid exchanges
of challenges and responses between the verifier and the prover. After this phase, the
prover authenticates himself by sending an m bit signature of all sent and received bits
— the value of m is not specified.
There are two possible attacks. The adversary can first query the legitimate prover
with a particular sequence of challenges. Whenever the verifier picks the same sequence
3 This idea was originally developed in an earlier work from Beth and Desmedt [1].
of challenges, the adversary succeeds. The other attack consists in guessing the final sig-
nature. The probability of false-acceptance over N protocol executions is thus approx-
imatively N · 2−min{m,n}, n being the number of responses provided during the fast
phase. Since the only key dependent bits are the m ones of the signature, this protocol
is optimal if m ≤ n and suboptimal otherwise.
Note that, although Brands and Chaum’s protocol may be optimal, depending on
the choice of the parameters m and n, once the number of fast phase rounds is fixed,
our protocol achieves a much lower probability of false-authentication in the non-relay
case — and the same in the relay case.
All the subsequently published protocols [3,4,7–12] that prevent relay attacks, while
having other features in terms of their complexity (computations, memory, amount of
information exchanged) and their functionalities (mutual authentication, resistance to
noise, resistance to colluding attacks), attain a probability of false-acceptance at best
equal to the one of Brands and Chaum in both the cases with and without relay. Part of
the reason is because authentication and proximity check are performed on the basis of
the same bits. In our case instead, the bits sent during the authentication and during the
proximity check differ. This main feature allows us to dramatically reduce the proba-
bility of false-acceptance in situations where relays are not implementable, yet active
attacks are possible.
We now compare our protocol with Hancke and Kuhn’s [7] since the structures of
the fast phases are related. In Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol, two registers x1, x2, . . . , xn
and y1, y2, . . . , yn are generated according to the secret key k and the random nonces a
and b. For each round i of the fast phase, the legitimate prover replies xi or yi depending
on whether the verifier’s challenge qi is equal to zero or one. The difference with our
protocol is that the response at time i depends only on the current challenge qi and not
on the past challenges (q1, q2, . . . , qi−1), i.e., ri(qi) = ri(qi).4 Because the adversary
can query the prover during the slow phase, she can obtain the equivalent of an entire
register. As a consequence, the probability of false-acceptance over N protocol execu-
tions is approximativelyN · (34 )
n
, which is significantly higher than for our protocol —
both with and without relay.
We end this section with a practical consideration on our protocol. Interestingly per-
haps, even if it gets interrupted during the fast phase, the verifier may still provide some
reliable decision on whether to accept or to reject the prover’s identity. (Of course, the
probability of false-acceptance will depend on how many replies the verifier obtained.)
This may be useful in situations where fast authentications are required — e.g., for toll
gates on highways — since it allows the verifier to take a decision even if the protocol
did not end properly.
6 Concluding remarks
The main contribution of this paper consists in a an authentication protocol that is
asymptotically optimal in terms of probability of false-acceptance both in the relay
and non-relay cases, in contrast with previous protocols.
4 The two registers can be seen as forming a decision tree where, at any level, each node value
depends only on whether it is issued by a left or a right branch.
The performance of the protocol, however, comes at the expense of additional stor-
age capabilities in order to compute the entire decision tree before executing the fast
phase. This makes the protocol mostly suitable in applications where the number of fast
phase rounds can be made small — for instance, in situations where relay attacks are
expected to occur rarely. Numerically, taking n = 11 for instance, requires a 1KByte
memory. Most RFID tags devoted to secure applications offer this value — the common
NXP Mifare Classic Standard tag provides a 1KByte memory and ICAO-compliant
electronic passports embed an at least 30KByte memory tag.
Finally, we note that several other optimality criteria may be considered in addition
to the one proposed in Section 4. An interesting direction to pursue might be, given the
size of the secret key, to seek the tradeoff between the probabilities of false-acceptance
with and without relay.
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